Optimal Bank Capital
By David Miles, Jing Yang, Gilberto Marcheggiano. 2013
489 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/39174cadf18c087b669e6c57168a4476f9aa7654
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Luc Laeven
- Hui Tong
- Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
- C. Calomiris
- Dinesh Gajurel
- Francesco Vallascas
- Richard J. Herring
- Lev Ratnovski
In Finance
- Luc Laeven
- Hui Tong
- Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
- Francesco Vallascas
- C. Calomiris
- Lev Ratnovski
- Jens Hagendorff
- Dinesh Gajurel
Citations in the corpus
- The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift (2013, unknown): “Moreover, the relative novelty both of macroprudential ideas and policy instruments means that there is also likely to be a process of ‘puzzling’ taking place amongst private sector lobbies as they figure out what their material interests are in relation to macroprudential policies, and of course ma”
- The Risk Sensitivity of Capital Requirements: Evidence from an International Sample of Large Banks* (2013, result): “In contrast to this view, other work suggests that the costs which banks incur to comply with higher capital requirements may well be modest, because a bank’s overall funding costs are likely to decrease as bank leverage decreases (Hellwig, 2010, Miles et al, 2012).”
- From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation (2012, background): “20 As senior economists at the Bank of England admitted subsequently: ‘In retrospect, we believe a huge mistake was made in letting banks come to have much less equity funding…than was normal in earlier times’ (Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano, 2011 : 37).”
- Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement (2011, background): “We believe a significant increase is necessary (see Admati et al. 2011 and Miles et al. 2011), but we recognize that there are negative, not just diminishing, social returns to achieving that higher amount of capital solely by raising equity capital requirements beyond some point.”
- Contagion and Banking Crisis - International Evidence for 2007-2009 (2015, background): “…the probability of systemic banking crises is reduced by stronger regulatory capital (Acharya et al., 2010; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole, 2012; Miles et al., 2013), the size of the banking sector and higher market concentration (Allen and Gale, 2000; Beck et al., 2006; Bretschger et al.,…”
- What do we know about the effects of macroprudential policy (2018, unknown): “Miles et al. (2012) provide estimates of socially optimal bank capital, considering overall economic (or social) costs.”
- Basel III: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? (2012, unknown): “They find (BCBS (2010a), for similar estimates see Miles et al. (2011)) that averaging across a number of studies of financial crises in many countries, increased capital and liquidity leads to a substantial reduction in the probability of a crisis event.”
- Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital (2016, result): “…these estimates is consistent with prima facie historical evidence, showing that spreads between the reference and lending rates were not higher in periods when banks were much more highly capitalized (see Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano 2012 for evidence from the United Kingdom and United States).”
- Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis (2017, unknown): “…Banking industry representatives emphasize that higher capital requirements reduce the availability of credit, while Admati et al. (2013) and Miles et al. (2013) argue that there are no social costs associated with higher capital ratios and significant increases in regulatory capital are…”
- Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default (2014, unknown): “This is consistent with BIS (2010) and Miles et al. (2013).”