Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt Evidence from Swiss Municipalities

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Do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes? (2008, background): “An exception is Feld and Kirchgassner (2001) , who find that the presence of rules does not affect budgetary outcomes in Swiss cantons.”
Direct Democracy Works (2005, unknown): “However, the evidence is that initiative states are no more likely to borrow than noninitiative states, and mandatory referendums on debt issues seem to reduce borrowing, if anything (Matsusaka, 1995; Bohn and Inman, 1996; Kiewiet and Szakaly, 1996; Feld and Kirchgassner, 2001).”
On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries (2010, background): “Feld and Kirchgässner (2001), for example, argue that direct-democratic institutions like budget referendums might prevent inefficient and selfish actions by politicians who operate within the general framework of a representative democracy.”