Information and Bank Credit Allocation

By Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez. 2004

646 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38307dee0b84db2be9042445cc7efa069edbc485

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Influence of bank concentration and institutions on capital structure: New international evidence (2008, methodology): “Following Titman and Wessels (1988), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), and Booth et al.”
Does a Manager's Gender Matter When Accessing Credit? Evidence from European Data (2017, background): “Financial institutions are also more supportive in providing credit because of the closeness of the relationship (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004), pre-existent relationships that are not necessarily linked to previous lending”
How Bank Market Concentration, Regulation, and Institutions Shape the Real Effects of Banking Crises (2010, background): “In markets with asymmetric information, however, higher bank market concentration may increase banks’ incentives to invest in the acquisition of soft information by establishing close relationships with borrowers over time (relationship banking), facilitating the availability of credit and thereby r”
Acquisition versus Greenfield: The Impact of the Mode of Foreign Bank Entry on Information and Bank Lending Rates (2007, neutral): “Theoretical studies on information sharing show that it is optimal for the incumbent bank to share either information about past outcomes (Padilla and Pagano (2000), Bouckaert and Degryse (2006)) or about a rms type (Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Padilla and Pagano (1997), Bouckaert and Degryse (200”
Competition and Relationship Lending: Friends or Foes? (2011, positive): “, the coefficients on the interaction terms between HHI and MUTUAL BANKS are expected to be negative), consistently with the strategic theory of relationship lending (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).”
Is financial inclusion good for bank stability? International evidence (2017, background): “Recent theoretical models show that fiercer competition not only induces banks to acquire less information on borrowers (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2004) but also persuade them towards more risky and opaque customers (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).”