The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

By Yuan Ju, Peter E. M. Borm, Pieter Ruys. 2004

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By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established. We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution. Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38088be19359c05850810f5040ec84c591aef3bf