A note on income tax evasion

By Richard T. Connelly. 2004

127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (2007, background): “In the standard model of tax evasion first proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), the taxpayer is treated as an isolated expected utility maximizer who makes a portfolio decision under uncertainty.”
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME TAX NONCOMPLIANCE (2010, background): “21 It is, however, important to note the point made by Yitzhaki (1974) that, when the penalty for a given amount of evasion is a fraction of the detected tax evasion, a higher tax rate automatically increases the penalty for a given perceived effect of the level of noncompliance on the perceived…”
The 'Flat Tax(Es)': Principles and Evidence (2006, background): “40 This result is due to Yitzhaki (1974).”
Tariffs, enforcement, and customs evasion: Evidence from India ☆ (2008, background): “And second, if not, would any consequential modification—especially if the cost of enforcement depended on the tariff itself (e.g. in Yitzhaki, 1974) —affect our theoretical finding that an improvement in customs enforcement should not only lower evasion but also the responsiveness of evasion with…”