Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

By David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris, Ady Pauzner. Journal of Economics Theory, 2003

423 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/36533661a0f3a218b786250b8eb22660c87fd615

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Citations in the corpus

A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (2007, background): “Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) extended the uniqueness result of Carlsson and van Damme to all supermodular games with complete information but illustrated in an example that the selected outcome may depend on the noise structure.”
Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups (2014, positive): “Indeed, in games with a continuum of players and a continuum of actions, Frankel et al. (2003) identify the continuity of the best-response function as an important assumption for uniqueness.”
Global Games: Theory and Applications (2003, positive): “The technique of analyzing the uniform prior private values game, and then showing continuity with respect to the general prior, common values game, follows Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2000).”
When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007, positive): ““Several basic conclusions have emerged from this research: Coordination failure is common …” (Camerer, 2003, p. 403) Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, or “payoff-asymmetric” coordination games (Camerer, 2003, section 7.4), have attracted major theoretical attention over the past two”
Strategic Complementarities and the Twin Crises (2005, positive): “Some of the theoretical tools we use here are based on the recent work of Frankel et al. (2003), who generalised the basic result of Carlsson and van Damme.4 To date, few models have addressed the relationship between currency crises and banking crises.”
Who Matters in Coordination Problems (2012, result): “This, combined with inequalities (6) and (7) leads to xg ≥ x−g − 2σ, which contradicts the hypothesis.”
Rollover Risk, Network Structure and Systemic Financial Crises (2012, neutral): “The properties of binary action, simultaneous move global games with a finite number of players have been investigated by Morris and Shin (2003) and Frankel et al. (2003).”