Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates

151 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Citations in the corpus

Fed Speak on Main Street (2016, unknown): “Effective monetary policy communication can shape the public’s expectations, reduce uncertainty, and provide accountability for politically independent central banks ( Stiglitz, 1998; Blinder et al., 2008; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2009 ).”
The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts (2012, unknown): “This index has recently been extended and updated for a large set of countries by Dincer and Eichengreen (2009).”
Monetary policy and bank lending rates in low-income countries: Heterogeneous panel estimates☆ (2014, unknown): “To check this conjecture, we re-estimated the cross-section regressions in Table 2 after including a measure of central bank transparency from Dincer and Eichengreen (2009).”
Optimal Central Bank Transparency (2008, unknown): “…al., Optimal central bank transparency, Journal of International Money and Finance (2010), doi:10.1016/j.jimon ﬁ n.2010.06.003 level of in ﬂ ation is an advantage compared to studies like Dincer and Eichengreen (2009), who use in ﬂ ation persistence instead of in ﬂ ation as the dependent variable.”
Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency (2009, unknown): “Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) combined the best of both by compiling the Eijffinger-Geraats index for 100 central banks from 1998 to 2005, and then updated it to 2006 (Dincer and Eichengreen 2009) .”