Objections to Bayesian statistics

By Andrew Gelman. 2008

237 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Bayesian inference is one of the more controversial approaches to statistics. The fundamental objections to Bayesian methods are twofold: on one hand, Bayesian methods are presented as an automatic inference engine, and this raises suspicion in anyone with applied experience. The second objection to Bayes comes from the opposite direction and addresses the subjective strand of Bayesian inference. This article presents a series of objections to Bayesian inference, written in the voice of a hypothetical anti-Bayesian statistician. The article is intended to elicit elaborations and extensions of these and other arguments from non-Bayesians and responses from Bayesians who might have dieren t perspectives on these is- sues.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Statistics and Probability

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

  1. Sergey Levine
  2. Pieter Abbeel
  3. Max Welling
  4. Yoshua Bengio
  5. Chelsea Finn
  6. Charles Blundell
  7. Ruslan Salakhutdinov
  8. Trevor Darrell

In Statistics and Probability

  1. Christian P. Robert
  2. Eric-Jan Wagenmakers
  3. Xun Huan
  4. Judith Rousseau
  5. Wolf Vanpaemel
  6. Ruud Wetzels
  7. Kerrie L. Mengersen
  8. Youssef M. Marzouk

Citations in the corpus