Regulating the Shadow Banking System

By Gary B. Gorton, Andrew Metrick. 2010

487 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32f5f6d303e778ff4bda8cb94f99976af3043eb9

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Citations in the corpus

Sizing Up Repo (2014, unknown): “On the other hand, there is the evidence from Gorton and Metrick (2010a, 2011) that haircuts in the interdealer (bilateral) repo market rose dramatically in the crisis.”
The History and Economics of Safe Assets (2016, unknown): “Gorton & Metrick (2010) outline two ways to create safe debt.”
The Euro Interbank Repo Market (2016, unknown): “Empirically, the run on repo (Gorton and Metrick, 2010a,b, 2012a,b) and credit crunch hypotheses (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, 2013) imply larger haircuts, lower volume, and higher repo rates when risk in the financial system increases.”
Reserve requirements and optimal Chinese stabilization policy (2017, methodology): “It is well known that shadow banking involves a tradeoff between reduced intermediation costs and increased risks to financial and macroeconomic stability (Gorton and Metrick, 2010; Verona, Martins and Drumond, 2013; Elliott et al., 2015).”
Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation (2015, unknown): “…not an excellent detailed description of the shadow banking system, and show that its total liabilities have the same order of magnitude as that of the traditional banking driven by regulatory arbitrage (see, e.g., Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2013; Gorton and Metrick 2010; Pozsar et al. 2010).”
Macro-Prudential Policies to Mitigate Financial System Vulnerabilities (2013, background): “For bank and nonbank financial institutions engaged in market-based activities, macroprudential regulations can take the form of pro-cyclical margin requirements (see, e.g., Geanakoplos, 2009; Gorton, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2010).”
Working Paper # 0001 January 5 , 2012 A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics (2012, unknown): “For example, Gorton and Metrick (2010) document the strong growth since the 1980s in repo and money-fund assets, and Loutskina and Strahan (2009) demonstrate that the widespread availability of securitization channels has improved liquidity in mortgage markets, reducing the sensitivity of credit…”
Money creation and the shadow banking system (2015, background): “Indeed, many argue that securitization grew rapidly before the recent financial crisis precisely because it was a financial innovation that enabled intermediaries to supply more money-like claims (e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 2010a,b, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2013).”