Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.

By Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco, Tom Lenaerts. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2006

990 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Genetics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32cfc970462158a6002f71328e1d659afb6aad9d

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Citations in the corpus

Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, background): “e network. We restrict our attention to the surroundings of two connected central players (called hubs), each linked to a large number of other, less connected players, as shown in Fig. 35. Following Santos et al. (2006c), we wish to illustrate the basic mechanism how cooperation gets supported when”
Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review (2013, background): “Social heterogeneity Owing to the overwhelming evidence indicating that social heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation in pairwise social dilemma games [85–89], it is natural to ask what is its impact on games governed by group interactions.”
Modelling dynamical processes in complex socio-technical systems (2011, result): “Finally, a wealth of surprising results, often overturning the common wisdom obtained by studies on regular networks, have been harvested on the voter and the Axelrod models 70–73 , and many other models for the emergence of cooperation 38,74 .”
Data Based Identification and Prediction of Nonlinear and Complex Dynamical Systems (2016, background): “However, this finding should not be interpreted as a counter-example to the leader’s role in evolutionary games [238,240], since the network based on friendship may violate the absolute selfish assumption of players who tend to be reciprocal with each other.”
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2012, background): “In the context of spatial games, network topology and hierarchies have been identified as a crucial determinant for the success of cooperative behavior [13–28], where in particular the scale-free topology has proven very beneficial for the evolution of cooperation.”
Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties (2006, methodology): “For the most popular social dilemmas of cooperation, we plot the fraction of cooperators who survive evolution, and averaged over 100 independent realizations for the same values of the temptation to cheat T, the disadvantage of being cheated S, and W. For W ¼ 0 and moderate selection intensity, tun”
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games (2010, background): “[29] Santos, FC, Pacheco, JM, Lenaerts, T (2006) Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.”
The H-index of a network node and its relation to degree and coreness (2016, background): “Previous studies have shown that protecting, immunizing and regulating large-degree nodes can maintain network connectivity 18 , halt infectious disease propagation 12 , enhance synchronizability 19 , improve transport capacity 20 and promote cooperation in evolutionary games 21 .”