Fiscal Competition in Space and Time
By David E. Wildasin. Social Science Research Network, 2003
140 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper analyzes fiscal competition among numerous spatially- separated jurisdictions in an explicitly dynamic framework. The degree of factor mobility between jurisdictions is imperfect because it is costly and time-consuming to adjust factor stocks. Even if it is harmful in the long run, a jurisdiction's residents can benefit in the short run from taxing mobile factors owned by non-residents. The optimal tax on mobile factors is lower, the faster the speed with which factors adjust to fiscal policy. Anticipated taxes are less beneficial than those that can be imposed unexpectedly.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/329d85eaa3e76a1dd9e7279ee4f86ae30a72102f
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Citations in the corpus
- International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, unknown): “But it may also discourage investors from building up new capital (Wildasin, 2003).”
- Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam (2013, unknown): “We control for province-industry (pj) and year (t) fixed effects, so the specification is capturing differential changes in employment across industries over time, netting out common national time trends and different average levels by province-industry cell.”
- Capital tax competition: bane or boon (2004, background): “Factor stocks may be perfectly mobile in the long run but only imperfectly mobile in the short run, and the desired fiscal treatment of these factors depends, in general, on the speed with which factor adjustments occur ( Wildasin, forthcoming ).”