Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia
By M. Khan. 2000
343 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/313efcebae7cfd3f056611c23b6a1968dc2c1dc7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Giovanni Dosi
- Mariana Mazzucato
- G. Semieniuk
- M. Cimoli
- M. Khan
- Richard R. Nelson
- Joseph E. Stiglitz
- Mushtaq H Khan
Citations in the corpus
- Markets, states and democracy: Patron–client networks and the case for democracy in developing countries (2005, background): “These characteristics include a larger ‘informal’ economy, widespread non-market accumulation processes (often described as primitive accumulation), and the use of state power to create a large range of rents that directly benefit the factions in power.(20) These economic characteristics of developi”
- Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development (2007, unknown): “…insightful distinctions about forms of rentcreation—to explain they produce incentives that promote or inhibit productivity growth in the economy (Khan and Komo 2000; Khan 2007) x.The 5 percent example ignores the problem that in most limited access orders, elites are also differentiated from…”
- Institutions and Policies Shaping Industrial Development: An Introductory Note (2006, background): “On the ‘perverse’ importance of rent-seeking in the development process, cf. Khan (2000a, 2000b).”
- Public financing of innovation: new questions (2017, background): “…when the public sector only attempts to facilitate rather than create additionality through mission oriented policies that crowd in the private sector, making private investments happen that would not have anyway, a problem discussed in the economic development literature (Khan and Kwame, 2000).”
- Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s: Background paper for World Economic and Social Survey 2006 (2007, background): “Secondly, even reasonably efficient markets face significant market failures in the process of organizing learning to overcome low productivity in late developers (Khan 2000b).”