Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts
By Steven Callander. Journal of Political Economy, 2005
124 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/305e3e30918aacfc476aafa99a3f8e73c0f69807
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Jonathan Rodden
- J. Martínez-Vázquez
- Lars P. Feld
- T. Baskaran
- Christoph A. Schaltegger
- L. Eyraud
- Lusine Lusinyan
- R. McNab
In Political Science and International Relations
- Jonathan Rodden
- J. Martínez-Vázquez
- Lars P. Feld
- T. Baskaran
- Christoph A. Schaltegger
- L. Eyraud
- Lusine Lusinyan
- R. McNab
Citations in the corpus
- Competition between Specialized Candidates (2010, unknown): “The same result applies in models where policy divergence is due to entry deterrence (Callander 2005; Palfrey 1984).”
- Inferring Strategic Voting (2013, unknown): “1See, e.g., Palfrey (1984), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), and Callander (2005) 2There are other behavioral models of voting, such as expressive voting (voters may vote for a candidate to send a signal).”
- The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences (2010, background): “F or p er so na l u se o nl y. of Hinich & Ordeshook (1974), Callander (2005), or Ansolabehere et al. (2005), the party of the left would win district 1 with a larger majority than that with which the party of the right would win district 5, which would create electoral bias as normally defined.”