Incentives and Outcomes: China's Environmental Policy

By Jing Wu, Yongheng Deng, Jun Huang, Randall K. Morck, Bernard Yeung. 2013

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2fd1fb3476a82f19b389f7f95aba4a183a8cd10a

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Citations in the corpus

Anti-Corruption Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study Evidence from China (2016, unknown): “Senior SOE managers have formal civil service ranks and their careers depend mainly on successfully implementing Party policies (Wu et al 2014, Deng et al., 2015).”
Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China (2018, unknown): “The first assumption has gained empirical support in the existing literature (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Wu et al., 2013; Yao and Zhang, 2015), whereas the second complementarity assumption has never been tested before.”
Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities (2016, background): “Second, Wu et al. (2013) show evidence that city spending on transportation infrastructure correlates strongly with real GDP growth and and that a higher GDP growth rate is related with better odds of promotion for local officials.”
Institutional open access at home and outward internationalization (2015, unknown): “FDI stock was calculated by the total accumulation of inward FDI in a province in five years adjusted by GDP. Moderating Variable Governor’s Tenure It was measured by the difference between the year a regional governor was inaugurated and a focal year (Wu et al., 2013).”
Economic growth, environmental sustainability and China mayors' promotion (2018, background): “For China, although there were a lot of researchers discussed the relationship between environmental policy and economic growth (e.g., Chen, et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2013), rare research had brought this question for Chinese political promotion system.”
Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives (2015, background): “Local officials’ promotion chances are enhanced by their success in achieving economic growth (Jia 2013, and Wu et al. 2014).”
The birth of edge cities in China: Measuring the effects of industrial parks policy (2017, unknown): “1 Being a host city of such parks has become favorite strategy of city mayors to compete for FDI and to foster ocal economic growth ( Wu et al., 2013; Zheng et al., 2014 ).”
Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China (2015, background): “…rewards and promotion (Chen, Li, and Zhou 2005; Li and Zhou 2005), environmental protection, especially in the context of inter- and intra-provincial socioeconomic disparities, has not played a significant role in the incentive structure of local government officials (e.g., Wu et al. 2013).”
Incentivizing China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism (2014, background): “Local officials thus sought to boost their local economy through attracting dirty industries, but had little incentive to reduce energy consumption or protect the environment in their own jurisdictions since such actions did not help their political career (Wu et al., 2013).”
Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China* (2018, background): “Doing so allows them to maximize their chances of career advancement (O’Brien and Li, 1999; Guo, 2009; Wu et al., 2013).”
Understanding China's Urban Pollution Dynamics (2013, methodology): “Wu et al. (2013) use data for more than 200 Chinese cities in 2001–09 to find that prefecture officials’ spending on urban infrastructure strongly tilts toward transportation which help to boost economic growth and land value in their jurisdictions, but those officials spend much less on…”