You are what you include: large-scale evaluation of remote javascript inclusions

By Nick Nikiforakis, L. Invernizzi, A. Kapravelos, S. Acker, Wouter Joosen, Christopher Krügel, Frank Piessens, Giovanni Vigna. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2012

331 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2f95e2ca11610cb334d8d777d7b0f0d5561e67bc

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Citations in the corpus

Small World with High Risks: A Study of Security Threats in the npm Ecosystem (2019, background): “[26] present a study of remote inclusion of JavaScript libraries in the most popular 10,000 websites.”
Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against Manipulation (2018, background): “averages of third-party script inclusion counts [55], as these sites will be counted as having zero inclusions.”
Anything to Hide? Studying Minified and Obfuscated Code in the Web (2019, background): “There have been various JavaScript and web security related studies recently, including a study on the prevalence of the eval function [27], on trust relationships between websites that include remote libraries and their corresponding library providers [21], on the communication between websites and”
Online Tracking: A 1-million-site Measurement and Analysis (2016, background): “…the amount of third-party Javascript inclusions across many popular sites and the vulnerabilities that arise from how the script is embedded [28], to measure the presence of security seals on the top 1 million sites [46], and to study stand-alone password generators and meters on the web…”
Dark Patterns at Scale (2019, background): “Automated measurements of this kind have proven useful in discovering various privacy and security issues on the web—including third-party tracking [25, 40] and detecting vulnerabilities of remote third-party JavaScript libraries [68]—by documenting how and on which websites these issues manifest, t”
Cookieless Monster: Exploring the Ecosystem of Web-Based Device Fingerprinting (2013, background): “While this is true [42], most users have first-party relationships with Google, meaning that they can be tracked accurately, without the need of resorting to history-based fingerprinting.”