Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
By Ariel Rubinstein. 2006
224 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2ef8977c46fd98d73429897144bd6cc06b734d02
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Kirsten I. M. Rohde
- Gijs van de Kuilen
- Adam S. Booij
- Uzi Segal
- Zvi Safra
- Ariel Rubinstein
- William S. Neilson
In General Decision Sciences
- Kirsten I. M. Rohde
- Gijs van de Kuilen
- Adam S. Booij
- Uzi Segal
- Zvi Safra
- Ariel Rubinstein
- William S. Neilson
Citations in the corpus
- A Typology of Players: Between Instinctive and Contemplative (2016, background): “Rubinstein (2013) proposed an alternative index which classifies subjects according to their response time, i.”
- A parameter-free analysis of the utility of money for the general population under prospect theory (2009, background): “Both Cox and Sadiraj (2006) and Rubinstein (2006) argue that it is not defined in terms of final wealth, and subsequently conclude that Rabin’s (2000a) critique of the expected utility model does not necessarily hold.”
- The hyperbolic factor: A measure of time inconsistency (2010, methodology): “These models have been used in many fields (Akerlof 2002; Harris and Laibson 2001; Krusell and Smith 2003; Laibson 1997; Luttmer and Mariotti 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Rubinstein 2003, 2006; Thaler and Benartzi 2004).”
- Narrow Bracketing and Dominated Choices (2009, unknown): “As suggested in Rabin (2000a, 2000b) and Rabin and Thaler (2001), and brought into further focus by Cox and Sadiraj (2006) and Rubinstein (2006), the culprit in the failure of the conventional model to account for departures from modest-scale risk neutrality is the premise that choice is determined…”
- Calibration Results for Non‐Expected Utility Theories (2005, background): “Moreover, the dual theory is a member of the larger class of constant risk aversion preferences (that is, constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion) which display similar behavior.”