How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects?

By Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris holm, Søren L. Buhl. 2003

834 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2e52a61f619c2b8919c193a95477fd9485b0a356

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Building and Construction

1. Bert van Wee
2. Bent Flyvbjerg
3. Eric Molin
4. C. Cantarelli
5. Mette K. Skamris holm
6. Bent Flybjerg
7. Søren L. Buhl
8. Mervyn K. Lewis

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Bent Flyvbjerg
2. Bert van Wee
3. Eric Molin
4. C. Cantarelli
5. Mette K. Skamris holm
6. Søren L. Buhl
7. Bent Flybjerg
8. Rui Cunha Marques

In Strategy and Management

1. Bent Flyvbjerg
2. Bert van Wee
3. Eric Molin
4. C. Cantarelli
5. Mette K. Skamris holm
6. Søren L. Buhl
7. Bent Flybjerg
8. Y. Kwak

Citations in the corpus

• Infrastructure Public–Private Partnerships in the Developing World: Lessons from Recent Experience (2015, background): “Guasch (2004) examined 670 PPPs (concessions) in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1985 and 2000 and found strikingly high rates of renegotiation, defined as a significant modification to the contract.”
• Large Infrastructure Projects: A Review of the Quality of Demand Forecasts and Cost Estimations (2007, positive): “International research comparable to the research as presented in Flyvbjerg et al (2003a) might provide some answers to the questions.”
• Inaccuracy in Traffic Forecasts (2006, neutral): “The authors also investigated the causes and cures of such under performance ( Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2003b, 2004; also Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a).”
• Flexible contracts to cope with uncertainty in public–private partnerships (2013, background): “Particularly regarding demand, forecasts have proven to be less than accurate (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).”
• Current Practice in Project Appraisal in Europe (2005, background): “Recent evidence (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003) shows that cost escalation occurs in almost nine out of ten projects and that actual cost on average are 28% higher than estimated/forecast cost.”
• Characteristics of Cost Overruns for Dutch Transport Infrastructure Projects and the Importance of the Decision to Build and Project Phases (2012, methodology): “This is also called the "decision date”, "the time of the decision to proceed," the "godecision" (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a).”
• What impacts the performance of large-scale government projects? (2016, background): “As a result, both researchers and practitioners have continually focused on the analysis of schedule delays in large-scale projects to finds ways for improvement (Assaf et al., 1995; Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b; Williams, 2003).”
• What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects? (2004, background): “The present paper is a companion paper to Flyvbjerg et al. (2003b) , which includes a full description of the sample, data collection and methodology.”
• Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness (2010, positive): “Finally, one of the leading pieces of research in the field of cost overruns in large transportation infrastructure projects is by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a).”
• Different Cost Performance: Different Determinants? The Case of Cost Overruns in Dutch Transport Infrastructure Projects (2012, positive): “onstruction costs determined at the Time of formal Decision to build (ToD). This is also called the "decision date”, "the time of the decision to proceed," the "go-decision" (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). At that moment, cost estimates were often available as data for decision-m”