The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
By Jean-Christophe Chazalette. 2013
490 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2da03620511b2d816dcc94dc864562a193e26f4e
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Citations in the corpus
- The Portuguese Slump and Crash and the Euro Crisis (2013, unknown): “This effect was larger in Europe, in part because of the financial instability and political uncertainty over whether and how the sovereign bonds of the periphery countries might default (Lane 2012).”
- The Eurozone and Political Economic Institutions (2016, background): “The collapse of house price bubbles in Ireland and Spain that accompanied the global financial crisis reduced the assets of the banks and brought them near to bankruptcy, forcing the government to step in and make taxpayers liable for the debts of the banks (Hardiman 2012, Lane 2012).”
- Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications (2013, unknown): “Since international markets can also help with risk-sharing and can reduce volatility, and the empirical evidence is mixed, the overall relationship of international financial integration and crises is, however, much debated (Kose and others, 2010; Lane, 2012).”
- Sovereign defaults and banking crises (2018, methodology): “Data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) indicate that in the 2001-02 Argentine default episode, real GDP per capita fell 10.64 percentage points below its trend. The benchmark calibration delivers an average decrease of 5.77 percent. The sovereign default triggers a credit crunch in the mod”
- Sovereign Risk and Belief-Driven Fluctuations in the Euro Area (2013, unknown): “In the stressed economies with weaker fundamentals, elevated sovereign risk was weighing on private credit markets and contributing to very tight financial conditions (see, for example, Lane 2012, ECB 2012, and IMF 2013).”
- Financial Globalisation and the Crisis (2012, unknown): “The main ingredients were discussed above in Section 3 and it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full treatment of the European reform debate (see also Lane 2012).”
- Stock trend forecasting in turbulent market periods using neuro-fuzzy systems (2015, background): “In addition financial crisis may arise from stock market crashes, currency crises (Corsetti et al. 1999), bursting of ‘financial bubbles’ [e.g. real estate market crisis (Haughwout et al. 2011)], and sovereign defaults (Lane 2012).”
- Transmission channels of systemic risk and contagion in the European financial network (2015, unknown): “Departing from the financial network approach, Duffie and Singleton (1999), and Ang and Longstaff (2013) use the sovereign credit risk channel to propagate sovereign – specific credit shocks and observe that it causes a cascade of defaults in U.S. and Eurozone sovereigns.”
- The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis (2016, background): “7 In December 2010, the European Council agreed to establish a permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which began operating in September 2012, and replaced temporary EU funding programs such as the EFSF.”
- European Monetary Integration and the Incompatibility of National Varieties of Capitalism (2016, unknown): “Without the existence of a coherent financial and/or banking union across Europe, unsustainable imbalances between the north and south started in the capital account (Lane, 2012; Burda, 2013; Jones, 2014 and 2015).”
- Does Infrastructure Investment Lead to Economic Growth or Economic Fragility? Evidence from China (2016, unknown): “8 Since 2009 Greece has been in the midst of one of the worst sovereign debt crises of recent memory that has hit poorer households particularly hard (Lane, 2012; Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013).”