What Do Firms Disclose and Why? Enforcing Corporate Governance and Transparency in Central and Eastern Europe

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Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies (2006, background): “Firms in Central and Eastern Europe sometimes voluntarily disclose more information than is required (Berglöf and Pajuste 2005).”
Transparency and Disclosure Scores and their Determinants in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (2006, background): “…to disclose their insider information, they will withhold private information when disclosure is too costly and that there is a strong country effect in what companies disclose (for empirical evidence on countrybased differences see, for example, Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Hope et al. , 2003).”
International business research and risky investments, an analysis of FDI in conflict zones (2013, unknown): “will be a U shaped.”
Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance (2013, unknown): “…of compliancewith codes of corporate governancewithin a single country or acrossmultiple countries (e.g. Akkermans et al., 2007; Alves andMendes, 2004; Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005; Chizema, 2008; Hooghiemstra and van Ees, 2011; Seidl et al., 2012; Talaulicar and Werder, 2008; Werder et al., 2005).”