Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity

By V. Acharya, Hyun Song Shin, Tanju Yorulmazer. 2011

352 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d194112578c08a711d4a97e456625e618b25ba5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Systemic Risk-Taking: Amplification Effects, Externalities, and Regulatory Responses (2011, positive): “Acharya et al. (2011) analyze the incentives of banks to hold liquidity to buy up the fire sales of competitors and find that these incentives are in general inefficient. This finding relies on ex-post heterogeneity among banks. By contrast, our work focuses exclusively on fire sales between a homog”
Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups (2014, neutral): “…also expressed concerns that such behavior worsens the economic outcome2, a topic to which several recent academic studies have been dedicated (Diamond and Rajan (2011); Acharya and Skeie (2011); Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011); Gale and Yorulmazer (2012); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)).”
The effect of bank capital on lending: Does liquidity matter? (2017, background): “Acharya et al. (2011) argue that the level of bank liquidity is countercyclical, inefficiently low during economic booms and excessively high during crisis periods. Cornett et al. (2011) and Berrosopide (2013) also find that banks’ efforts to increase liquidity buffers”
A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets (2011, background): “Hence, the banks optimal choice of new debt f must be small enough to satisfy the incentive constraint (5), which according to the depositor rationality constraint 12Recall that the payo¤ to the lending bank on the inter-bank loan lr that occurs with probability is unveriable to depositors and is ”
Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model of Banking (2014, background): “Bhattacharya et al. (2002) and Peura and Keppo (2006) consider capital regulation only with bank closure rules implemented under banks’ random audits.”
The Term Structure of Interbank Risk (2012, neutral): “The speculative motive for cash hoarding is modeled by Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2012), Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011), and Diamond and Rajan (2011).”