Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking.

By Jorge M. Pacheco, Arne Traulsen, Martin A. Nowak. Physical Review Letters, 2006

636 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected.

Subfields: Genetics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c4553ee6388b1087ed0b8d2c4ef94babd45333b

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Citations in the corpus

Social Networks and Causal Inference (2013, background): “The work done by Martin Nowak and colleagues (Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Pacheco et al. 2006) on the coevolution of networks and cooperation laid a good foundation for this (e.g., Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Pacheco et al. 2006).”
Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, background): “ons of co-evolutionary models are extended to involve stochastic elements (irrational choices) in the evolution of both the strategy distribution and the connectivity structure (Santos et al., 2006a; Pacheco et al., 2006a). Such an adaptive individual behavior introduces two time scales (τl and τs) ”
Games on graphs (2014, background): “tionships may change based on prior interactions [90], [23], [75], [74] reputations [25], or other factors [99], [98], [105], [119], [13].”
Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics (2009, background): “This promising idea has already been proposed [138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145] and a number of interesting results, which would deserve a separate review on their own right(7), have been obtained regarding the emergence of cooperation.”
Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection (2008, background): “(7) In previous work [30, 31, 32], there is a di erent strategy update procedure.”
Critical phenomena in complex networks (2007, background): “The second direction is the coevolving networks and interacting systems defined on them (Holme and Newman, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2006).”