The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Testing international trade law: Empirical studies of GATT/WTO dispute settlement

By M. Busch, E. Reinhardt. 2002

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2b8448787469bc72f42cc67b377a115243ebb7e9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. E. Reinhardt
2. Paul Ingram
3. M. Busch
4. Jeffrey A. Robinson
5. C. L. Davis
6. S. Bermeo
7. Gregory Jackson
8. Elinor Ostrom

In Political Science and International Relations

1. E. Reinhardt
2. M. Busch
3. C. L. Davis
4. Paul Ingram
5. Jeffrey A. Robinson
6. S. Bermeo
7. Gregory Jackson
8. Elinor Ostrom

In Strategy and Management

1. E. Reinhardt
2. Paul Ingram
3. M. Busch
4. Jeffrey A. Robinson
5. C. L. Davis
6. S. Bermeo
7. Gregory Jackson
8. Linda Argote

Citations in the corpus

• Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication (2009, background): “Busch and Reinhardt (2002) suggest there is a pattern of countersuits.”
• Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement (2003, background): “FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY OF FULL CONCESSIONS BY COMPLAINANT STATUS AND PERIOD complaints filed against developing country targets, with developing countries going from 8 percent to 37 percent of the defendant pool in the GATT versus the WTO eras (Busch and Reinhardt, 2002, p. 466).”
• The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness1 (2005, methodology): “As Busch and Reinhardt (2002) explain, the punch of the GATT/WTO comes from the potential to produce a clear normative statement embodied in a ruling, a potential which induces most disputants to settle before a ruling is rendered.”