Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India*

By Esther Duflo, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, Nicholas Ryan. 2013

446 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2b3b3acc9a702bf973a0ddbc32d6bd6d387f9f7e

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Esther Duflo

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Citations in the corpus

Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance (2022, background): “, environmental inspections are described as third party auditors [35]).”
Evidence-based policymaking: promise, challenges and opportunities for accounting and financial markets research** (2018, unknown): “First, Duflo et al. (2013) perform a field experiment in environmental auditing to study the conflicts of interest that arise when firms choose and pay their auditor.”
The Economist as Plumber (2017, background): “Another example is the third-party audit system that the Supreme Court of Gujarat mandated in an attempt to improve the monitoring of industrial pollution (Duflo et al., 2013).”
Watering Down Environmental Regulation in China* (2020, background): “Among the handful of economic studies focusing on water quality, Sigman (2002) and Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016) use biochemical oxygen demand (BOD); Duflo et al. (2013) use BOD and COD (and several other indicators); and Keiser and Shapiro (2019a) focus on “dissolved oxygen” and whether water is…”
The Personnel Economics of the State (2015, unknown): “Duflo et al. (2013) examine the implications of corrupted information flows for regulatory efficacy.”
The contents of assurance statements for sustainability reports and information asymmetry (2017, background): “However, Duflo et al. (2013) show that environmental reports are not always audited in a way that helps to overcome concerns regarding its credibility.”
Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China’s War on Air Pollution (2020, unknown): “Second, we contribute to a growing literature on environmental monitoring and regulation (e.g., Duflo et al., 2013, 2018; Shimshack, 2014; Greenstone and Hanna, 2014; Browne et al., 2019).”
Envirodevonomics: A Research Agenda for an Emerging Field (2015, background): “On the other hand, new evidence indicates that improving incentives for bureaucrats can both reduce corruption and improve monitoring and enforcement outcomes in developing countries (for example, Duflo et al. 2013).”