From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party

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Partisan Politics: The Empirical Evidence from OECD Panel Studies (2017, unknown): “…agree to not reject the “cartel-partyhypothesis” describing that political parties had formed a cartel, “employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success” (Katz and Mair 2009: 753; see Katz and Mair 1995 and 2009 and Blyth and Katz 2005).”
Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries (2010, unknown): “Rightwing parties prefer protection of property rights, rule of law and legal quality more than leftwing parties because they desire to protect merit and the gains from talent (B jSZlrnskov 2005a, 2005b). State intervention is justified in this context only if it attacks or restricts obstacles to ef”
Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries (2009, background): “This literature, in particular, dismisses the move of ideologically leftwing and rightwing parties towards “catch-all” parties (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995; Blyth and Katz 2005).”