Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

By Michelle René Lowry, Kevin J. Murphy. 2007

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2a225c4163ab7feecbeda40adbbc2d6565668bd6

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Ruth V. Aguilera
2. Igor Filatotchev
3. R. Bell
4. Mike W. Peng
5. Mike Wright
6. Emmanuel Adegbite
7. William Q. Judge
8. Gregory Jackson

In Finance

1. Igor Filatotchev
2. Ruth V. Aguilera
3. R. Bell

In Strategy and Management

1. Ruth V. Aguilera
2. R. Bell
3. Igor Filatotchev
4. Mike W. Peng
5. Mike Wright

Citations in the corpus

• Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, unknown): “The concern is that CEOs in newly public firms often obtain options at the IPO issue-price rather than the first-day-close price (see e.g., Lowry and Murphy, 2007), allowing them to benefit from underpricing.”
• Corporate Governance and Investors' Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value: An Institutional Perspective (2014, background): “One of the most common ways is to isolate whether an IPO firm operates in a high-tech industry or not, since technological orientation may also be a proxy for investors’ perceptions of riskiness (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005; Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Lowry & Murphy, 2007).”