Pricing of Seasoned Equity Offers and Earnings Management

By Yongtae Kim, M. Park. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2005

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Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “Second, when firms decide to issue new long-term debt or equity capital, insiders of these firms can manage earnings to enhance their appearance to capital providers (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kim and Park, 2005; Teoh et al., 1998).”
Corporate social responsibility, real activities earnings management, and corporate governance: evidence from Korea (2016, background): “When firms borrow money from a bank or issue stocks in the capital market, they might be motivated to manage earnings to finance capital at lower cost (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Kim and Park 2005).”
Seasoned Equity Offerings: Quality of Accounting Information and Expected Flotation Costs (2009, unknown): “Evidence of earnings management in order to raise offer prices or gross proceeds is reported in a number of recent studies (DuCharme et al., 2004; Kim and Park, 2005; Lee and Masulis, 2007; Ragan, 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh et al., 1998a, and 1998b, Teoh, Wong and Rao, 1998, Teoh and Wang, 2002).”
Disclosure frequency and earnings management (2007, background): “Kim and Park (2005) use discretionary accruals over two quarters, Q(-1) and Q(0), to test whether equity issuers employing aggressive accounting decisions also more aggressively push up their offer prices, thereby leading to a decrease in underpricing.(4) In Kim and Park (2005), Q(-1) is defined as ”