Sybilproof reputation mechanisms

By Alice Cheng, Eric J. Friedman. P2PECON '05, 2005

312 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Due to the open, anonymous nature of many P2P networks, new identities - or sybils - may be created cheaply and in large numbers. Given a reputation system, a peer may attempt to falsely raise its reputation by creating fake links between its sybils. Many existing reputation mechanisms are not resistant to these types of strategies.Using a static graph formulation of reputation, we attempt to formalize the notion of sybilproofness. We show that there is no symmetric sybilproof reputation function. For nonsymmetric reputations, following the notion of reputation propagation along paths, we give a general asymmetric reputation function based on flow and give conditions for sybilproofness.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/29bc10f28d361ddb9beaa9c61dbb49f849e3d1af

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In Artificial Intelligence

  1. Rongxing Lu
  2. Xuemin Shen
  3. Cristina Nita-Rotaru
  4. L. Subramanian
  5. Xiaohui Liang
  6. Abraham D. Flaxman
  7. Michael Kaminsky
  8. Clay Shields

In Information Systems

  1. Jinyang Li
  2. L. Subramanian
  3. Bonan Min
  4. Dinh Nguyen Tran
  5. Neil Zhenqiang Gong
  6. Cristina Nita-Rotaru
  7. Rongxing Lu
  8. Xuemin Shen

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Cristina Nita-Rotaru
  2. Rongxing Lu
  3. L. Subramanian
  4. Clay Shields
  5. Brian Neil Levine
  6. David Zage
  7. Bonan Min
  8. Dinh Nguyen Tran

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