Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

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Plural self-awareness (2014, background): “The question at stake here is the relationship between what Kriegel (2009) proposes to distinguish as the “qualitative character” (the “what it is like”) and the “subjective character” (the “for me”) of consciousness.”
Being for no-one (2020, background): “And self-representation theories hold that mental states are phenomenally conscious just when, in addition to their other contents, they represent themselves as being mental states of the subject whose they are (Kriegel, 2009).”
The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience (2013, unknown): “ Chalmers, D. (2004) “The Representational Character of Experience”.”