Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem

By A. Cukierman. 2000

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2788fa3455cc5ccd78149227f8cbe83fd00277f1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent About Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make? (2002, background): “Recent arguments for and against doing that appear in Faust and Svensson (2001), Geraats (1999), Jensen (2000), and Cukierman (2001) and are partially summarized in the last paper.”
Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency (2009, unknown): “This argument for opacity about the central bank’s output preferences is similar to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and helps to explain central banks’ reticence about their output preferences.”
Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice (2006, background): “When supply or transmission shocks are disclosed, the public could incorporate them into its inflation expectations, which leads to greater inflation volatility and hampers output stabilization (Cukierman 2001, Jensen 2002).”
Do Central Banks Have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability? - Theory and Evidence (2002, background): “Except for her paper that focusses on somewhat different issues recent work on asymmetries in monetary policy either assumes a discontinuity at zero for the output gap (Cukierman (2000, 2002)) or speciÞes losses by means of the Linex function (Nobay and Peel (1998) and Ruge-Murcia (2000, 2001)).”
Communication and Decision-Making by Central Bank Committees: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness? (2005, unknown): “Coded: CEC=1, no entry for monetary policy 51 ECB Working Paper Series No. 488 May 2005 52 ECB Working Paper Series No. 488 May 2005 European Central Bank working paper series For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website (http://www.ecb.int) 435 “Reformi”
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future (2008, background): “Cukierman (2000a) formalizes this asymmetry by postulating that the CB is concerned with losses arising from negative output gaps but is indifferent to the size of the gap as long as it is positive and shows that, in such a case, there will be an in ﬂ ation bias even if the bank aims at achieving…”
How Do Central Banks Talk (2001, background): “The seminal argument for limited transparency, due to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), rests on the assumption that anticipated monetary policy is”
The Limits of Transparency (2011, unknown): “Further details appear in Cukierman (2001) and in Gersbach (2003).”
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination (2006, background): “In a model with no inflationary bias and no trade-off between credibility and flexibility, Cukierman (2001) stresses that when the central bank tries to achieve two goals, limited transparency improves the expected social welfare.”