Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game

By C. Hauert, Michael Doebeli. Nature, 2004

1,420 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Genetics, Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/26f406072b94ba16b2c043695ecb004f6aca47c1

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Citations in the corpus

Data Based Identification and Prediction of Nonlinear and Complex Dynamical Systems (2016, background): “For example, for the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) [235] and the snowdrift games (SG) [236], the payoff matrices are”
Evolutionary games on graphs and the speed of the evolutionary process (2010, neutral): “We note that there has also been some discussion of the alternative version of the Hawk-Dove game, the snowdrift game, in spatial structures (Hauert & Doebeli, 2004; Ohtsuki & Nowak, 2006b); but we describe the game in its classical format, which we believe is a natural step and which will have…”
Evolutionary game theory: Theoretical concepts and applications to microbial communities (2010, background): “Field studies as well as experimental and theoretical investigations have shown that the locality of the interactions leads to the self-formation of complex spatial patterns [1, 79–93].”
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games (2010, background): “[26] Hauert, C, Doebeli, M (2004) Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game.”
A new route to the evolution of cooperation (2006, background): “…2 0 05 THE AUTHORS 1 9 ( 2 0 06 ) 7 26 – 7 3 3 JOURNAL COMP I LA T I ON ª 2005 EUROPEAN SOC I E TY FOR EVOLUT IONARY B IO LOGY updating of strategies (Hauert & Doebeli, 2004) as well as if we replace the denominator k> (T ) S) in p by, for example, kmax (T ) S), with kmax the maximum degree of…”
Games on graphs (2014, background): “For other graph structures, our understanding of evolutionary game dynamics with non-weak selection comes primarily from simulations [36], [95], [82], [78].”
The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations: score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility (2005, background): “…on the evolution of cooperation in the lattice model assumed that fertility depends on the game’s score, but that mortality is independent of the score (Nowak and May, 1992; Wilson et al., 1992; Mitteldorf and Wilson, 2000; Brandt et al., 2003; Le Galliard et al., 2003; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004).”
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation. (2004, background): “, 1999; Ferriere and Michod, 1995, 1996; Killingback and Doebeli, 1996; Nowak and May, 1992)- although this depends on the payoff structure (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004), the initial parameters and the level of stochasticity (Hauert, 2002).”