Investing in Protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements between North and South

By M. Manger. 2009

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/25c5618c5538851c7e5d88e111f9384f7fe35286

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements (2016, background): “Already under NAFTA, often referred to as the ’first sinner agreement’ (Manger, 2009), business and trade unions debated over how extensively trade policy-makers should include EP and labour standards in the deal (Cameron and Tomlin, 2002).”
Greening up: the effects of environmental standards in EU and US trade agreements (2017, background): “However, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have become a major feature of today’s global economy with the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) signing the highest number of PTAs with developing countries to gain access to new markets (Manger 2009, Sbragia 2010).”
Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations (2016, background): “According to this argument PTAs are intended to liberalize trade in goods generated by FDI; exports of capital and intermediate goods to subsidiaries and imports back to the home market (Manger 2009: 10).”
The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy (2011, background): “…that methodological reductionism is not always well-suited to the politics of foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties as well+ See Manger 2009; Saban, Bonomoa, and Stier-Mosesc 2010; and Bauerle Danzman 2010+ 65+ Nor are the three macro processes I explore exhaustive of omitted…”
The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset (2013, background): “Much work has focused on arguments drawing on competition effects among important trading nations and/or interest group mobilization and industry and market characteristics (Baldwin 1993; Baccini and D¨ur 2012; Chase 2003; D¨ur 2007; Grossman and Helpman 1995; Manger 2009; Milner 1997).”
Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting (2017, unknown): “Chase 2003; Manger 2009; and Osgood 2016.”
The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence (2017, background): “Bombardini 2008; Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2015; Manger 2009; Milner 1988.”