To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization
By A. Guzman, Beth A. Simmons. The Journal of Legal Studies, 2002
125 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper seeks to understand the factors that cause disputes at the World Trade Organization to move from the negotiation stage to the panel stage. We hypothesize that transfer payments between states are costly to arrange and that the lowest‐cost transfers are those that relate directly to the issue in dispute. This implies that when the subject matter of the dispute has an all‐or‐nothing character and leaves little room for compromise (for example, health and safety regulations), the parties' ability to reach an agreement through the use of transfers is restricted. In contrast, if the subject matter of dispute permits greater flexibility (for example, tariff rates), the parties can more easily structure appropriate transfer payments through adjustments to the disputed variable. We conduct an empirical test of this hypothesis, finding support for it among democratic states.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/25a5803c5722a4f220e4f68a209ad6a67394ec6b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Political Science and International Relations
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes (2005, unknown): “It introduced a number of changes to the practices that existed under the pre-WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and these changes are described in great detail in many other places (Cameron and Campbell 1998; Guzman and Simmons 2002).”
- Treaty Compliance and Violation (2010, background): “But the truth of the matter is that political scientists have spent much more time researching trade bargaining within WTO institutions than compliance per se (Busch & Reinhardt 2003; Guzman & Simmons 2002).”