Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States
By M. Hajek. 2015
237 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/250793f3254f70f877226bfcece275ebbfec259f
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Citations in the corpus
- State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance (2016, unknown): “For state capacity problems in sub-saharan Africa, see Migdal (1988), Herbst (2000), and Bates (2001). By contrast, states have played important development roles in Asian Tiger nations.”
- Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations (2020, background): “Acemoglu et al. (2011) argue that inefficient states based on patronage can emerge and persist as the result of a winning coalition between the elites, who are interested in limiting redistribution, and the bureaucrats, who are interested in maintaining their rents. Drugov (2015) underlines how patr”
- Inequality and growth: the neglected time dimension (2013, methodology): “…hand, inequality may hamper growth by, e.g., promoting expensive fiscal policies (Perotti, 1993); by inducing an inefficient state bureaucracy (Acemoglu et al. 2008); by hampering human capital formation (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004); by leading to political instability…”
- Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries (2014, unknown): “The perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions are important determinants of growth (Acemoglu, 2003, 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2011; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010), market development (Greif, 2012), economic liberalization (Grosjean and Senik, 2011) and post-conflict political recovery (Big”
- Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution (2014, unknown): “When such a bargain can be forged, elites can mobilize a critical mass of citizens or strike a deal with political dissidents to generate the coalition they need to support a democratic transition.23 Spain’s 18 Albertus and Menaldo 2012a. 19 Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2007.”
- Taxing the unobservable: The impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation (2017, unknown): “Second, by showing that a larger shadow economy results in a reduction in taxation, the paper contributes to our knowledge of the political economy of taxation and the tax burden, such as Acemoglu (2005) or Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2011).”