Agri-environment contract adoption under fixed and variable compliance costs

By G. Ducos, P. Dupraz, F. Bonnieux. 2009

115 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Agricultural and Biological Sciences, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2500e1d6e99c799c2719072166667693dc056f90

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. G. Garrod
2. R. Préget
3. Sophie Thoyer
4. L. Kuhfuss
5. Nesha Beharry-Borg
6. S. Chabé-Ferret
7. James C. R. Smart
8. Klaus Hubacek

In General Agricultural and Biological Sciences

1. A. Tolón‐Becerra
2. X. Lastra-Bravo
3. S. Chabé-Ferret
4. C. Hubbard
5. A. Coggan
6. G. Garrod
7. Stuart Whitten
8. N. Hanley

In Soil Science

1. A. Coggan
2. G. Garrod
3. Stuart Whitten
4. E. Buitelaar
5. Jeffrey Bennett

Citations in the corpus

• What drives farmers’ participation in EU agri-environmental schemes?: Results from a qualitative meta-analysis (2015, background): “Farmers’ experiences with past AESs and other environmentally-friendly farming practices has been shown in several studies to have a significant effects on farmers’ willingness to adopt a new AES (Wilson and Hart, 2000; Ducos et al., 2009; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Hynes and Garvey, 2009).”
• Evaluating farmers’ likely participation in a payment programme for water quality protection in the UK uplands (2013, background): “Espinosa-Goded et al.’s (2010) results related to participation in an AES to promote nitrogen-fixing crops in Spain.”
• How much green for the buck? Estimating additional and windfall effects of French agro-environmental schemes by DID-matching (2010, result): “Overall, these results suggest a significant selection on observables and they are coherent with previous empirical studies of the determinants of participation in these AESs [9].”
• Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus (2016, background): “…on specific attributes of the contract such as the contract duration, the flexibility permitted by the menu of authorized management practices, and the perceived transaction costs associated with administration and control (Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Ducos et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 2009).”
• Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why? (2013, background): “1) The characteristics of the transaction: degree of asset specificity,(5) institutional and biophysical uncertainty surrounding transactions and transaction frequency (Williamson, 1985); 2) The characteristics of the transactors: bounded rationality and broad past experience (Challen, 2000; Ducos a”