The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

By Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, Mitu Gulati. Social Science Research Network, 2013

342 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief – over 50 per cent of 2012 GDP – with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents – particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors – that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/24e048c701ad3819fabccab9308a411a73e0554a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Stefano Rossi
2. B. Schwaab
3. Luigi Bocola
4. André Lucas
5. Xin Zhang
6. Alberto Martin
7. N. Gennaioli
8. S. J. Koopman

In Finance

1. Luigi Bocola
2. André Lucas
3. B. Schwaab
4. Xin Zhang
5. Stefano Rossi
6. Alberto Martin
7. N. Gennaioli
8. S. J. Koopman

In Sociology and Political Science

1. B. Schwaab
2. Stefano Rossi
3. André Lucas
4. Xin Zhang
5. Alberto Martin
6. N. Gennaioli

Citations in the corpus

• The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk (2016, background): “I set the haircut D to 0.55, a value that is consistent with the Greek debt restructuring of 2012 (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati 2013).”
• Banks, government Bonds, and Default: What do the data Say? (2014, positive): “Finally, we show that our results survive under different definitions of defaults such as: (i) the haircut measure of default constructed by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) and Zettelmeyer et al. (2012), which measures the severity of a default (Columns 11 and 12), and; (ii) the augmented measure that ad”
• Conditional Euro Area Sovereign Default Risk (2014, positive): “This is roughly in line with the recovery rate that investors received on average in the Greek debt restructuring in Spring 2012, see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati (2013).”