Prosocial learning agents solve generalized Stag Hunts better than selfish ones

By Alex Peysakhovich, Adam Lerer. 2017

127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Real world interactions are full of coordination problems [2, 3, 8, 14, 15] and thus constructing agents that can solve them is an important problem for artificial intelligence research. One of the simplest, most heavily studied coordination problems is the matrixform, two-player Stag Hunt. In the Stag Hunt, each player makes a choice between a risky action (hunt the stag) and a safe action (forage for mushrooms). Foraging for mushrooms always yields a safe payoff while hunting yields a high payoff if the other player also hunts but a very low payoff if one shows up to hunt alone. This game has two important Nash equilibria: either both players show up to hunt (this is called the payoff dominant equilibrium) or both players stay home and forage (this is called the risk-dominant equilibrium [7]).

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  1. Sergey Levine
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  5. Mohit Bansal
  6. Luca Weihs
  7. Abhinav Kumar Gupta
  8. Tonghan Wang

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