When mechanistic models explain
By Carl F. Craver. Synthese, 2006
500 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Astronomy and Astrophysics, History and Philosophy of Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/246f1223bafb127c325651f13c440ca0f5552727
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Astronomy and Astrophysics
In History and Philosophy of Science
- Collin Rice
- Carlos A. Zednik
- Gualtiero Piccinini
- Robert W. Batterman
- Carl F. Craver
- Atoosa Kasirzadeh
- Christopher Pincock
- Julia R. S. Bursten
Citations in the corpus
- Minimal Model Explanations (2014, background): “Accuracy requirements are prominent in various accounts that claim that only mechanistic models explain ðCraver 2006; Kaplan 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011Þ. Mechanistic accounts typically place extremely strict accuracy conditions on explanatory models by requiring that the model accurately describe…”
- The Nature of Dynamical Explanation* (2011, methodology): “But an explanation shows why the relations are as they are in the phenomenal model, and so reveals conditions under which those relations might change or fail to hold altogether” (Craver 2006, 358).”
- Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches (2011, background): “Descriptions of mechanisms—mechanism schemas (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000) or models (Glennan 2005, Craver 2006)—can be more or less complete.”