The Spread of Aggressive Corporate Tax Reporting: A Detailed Examination of the Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Shelter

By Jennifer L. Brown. 2011

192 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/23e1c6360563ae9e0483af979e9e7f915309dadc

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Citations in the corpus

Board of Director Gender and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis (2017, background): “Prior research finds that corporate governance and board characteristics significantly influences tax aggressiveness (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Brown 2011; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Brown and Drake 2014).”
Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “Researchers have examined the influence of several important relationships on tax avoidance, including relationships with owners (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010), employees (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui, 2013), joint-venture partners (Shevlin, 1987), potential acquirers (Erickson, 1998), and other”
Carbon Emissions, Firm Size, and Corporate Governance Structure: Evidence from the Mining and Agricultural Industries in Indonesia (2019, background): “Consistent with Brown (2011), there is great pressure to disclose carbon emissions to avoid negative perceptions by outside stakeholders [49].”
Tax Avoidance and Ex Ante Cost of Capital (2017, unknown): “Specifically, Brown (2011), Brown and Drake (2014), and Kubick et al. (2015) provide evidence that diversifying tax risk within an industry is difficult if not impossible.”
Seeking Shelter: Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information (2010, unknown): “12 Previous studies also interpret Reportable Transactions, such as COLI, as tax shelters (Graham and Tucker 2006; Brown 2009; and Wilson 2009).”
Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy (2014, unknown): “A growing body of research (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Bizjak et al. 2009; Stuart and Yim 2010; Brown 2011; Cai and Sevilir 2012; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2012) examines the role of board networks in corporate financial policy.”
The Effects of Regulatory Scrutiny on Tax Avoidance: An Examination of SEC Comment Letters (2016, background): “Brown (2011) finds that corporate-owned life insurance tax sheltering strategies spread through board interlocks. Brown and Drake (2014) similarly find that firms related via social network ties exhibit similar levels of tax avoidance. Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, and Omer (2015) find a positive associa”
The economic effects of financial derivatives on corporate tax avoidance (2015, result): “Overall, these estimates are comparable to those for other sophisticated tax planning strategies, including some tax shelters (Wilson, 2009; Brown, 2011).”