Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning

By Jonathan Way. 2017

116 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that normative reasons are premises of good reasoning – that for some consideration to be a normative reason to ? is for it to be the premise of good reasoning towards ?-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this paper, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful, and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out some implications of the resulting view for the debate over pragmatic reasons for belief and other attitudes and one influential form of reductionism about the normative.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/222c1acaf5a779e34b7c760da2f2f6aead442311

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Conor McHugh
2. Jonathan Way

In Philosophy

1. Conor McHugh
2. Jonathan Way

Citations in the corpus

• What is Reasoning (2018, background): “January 2018 McHugh and Way 2017 nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /m ind/article-abstract/127/505/167/3884648 by U niversity of Southam pton user on 18 N ovem ber 2018 pattern of reasoning is fallacious.”