Physical Layer Security in UAV Systems: Challenges and Opportunities
By Xiaofang Sun, Derrick Wing Kwan Ng, Zhiguo Ding, Yanqing Xu, Zhangdui Zhong. IEEE wireless communications, 2019
297 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) wireless communications has experienced an upsurge of interest in both military and civilian applications, due to its high mobility, low cost, on-demand deployment, and inherent line-of-sight air-to-ground channels. However, these benefits also make UAV wireless communication systems vulnerable to malicious eavesdropping attacks. In this article, we aim to examine the physical layer security issues in UAV systems. In particular, passive and active eavesdropping are two primary types of attack in UAV systems. We provide an overview on emerging techniques, such as trajectory design, resource allocation, and cooperative UAVs, to fight against both types of eavesdropping in UAV wireless communication systems. Moreover, the applications of non-orthogonal multiple access, multiple-input multiple-output, and millimeter-wave in UAV systems are also proposed to improve the system spectral efficiency and to guarantee security simultaneously. Finally, we discuss some potential research directions and challenges in terms of physical layer security in UAV systems.
Subfields: Aerospace Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/22022f37ff05e87f67befdbbd4a6fb19f2b1ebeb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Aerospace Engineering
- Rui Zhang
- Robert Schober
- Emil Björnson
- Derrick Wing Kwan Ng
- Lipeng Zhu
- Qingqing Wu
- Jiayi Zhang
- Xiang-Gen Xia
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Rui Zhang
- Emil Björnson
- Derrick Wing Kwan Ng
- Robert Schober
- Jiayi Zhang
- Luca Sanguinetti
- Qingqing Wu
- Michail Matthaiou
Citations in the corpus
- A Survey on Millimeter-Wave Beamforming Enabled UAV Communications and Networking (2021, background): “, eavesdroppers, jammers, and untrusted nodes [32], [325].”
- Prospective Multiple Antenna Technologies for Beyond 5G (2019, background): “Although the LoS channel characteristics facilitate the establishment of strong desired communication links, they are also vulnerable to multi-cell interference or potential eavesdropping [180]–[183].”