Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations

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An Estimated Monetary DSGE Model with Unemployment and Staggered Nominal Wage Bargaining (2008, unknown): “The firm’s hiring decision yields: κtxt (i) = p w t fnt (i)− wt (i) + βEtΛt,t+1∂Ft+1 (i) /∂nt (i) , (23)”
Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle (2011, unknown): “b+ βEWu(ŷ) > −kλeθe(z, y) + (1− λep(θe(z, y))me(z, y)) [y + z + βEWe(z, ŷ)] +λep(θ ∗ e(z, y))Ez0 {[αce(z, z, y) + (1− α)me(z, y)] [y + z0 + βEWe(z0, ŷ)]} , (11)”
Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining (2006, background): “The solution is such that: (i) w∗ (s) solves the bargaining condition (22); (ii) (s) and μ (w, s) satisfy (23) and (24); (iii) x (w, s) satisfies the hiring condition (12); (iv) w (s0) is given by the Calvo process for wages (21); (v) r (s) satisfies (10); (vi) w̄ (s) and x̄ (s) are defined as in (2”
More on Unemployment and Vacancy Fluctuations (2007, unknown): “2 Proof to Proposition 2 The claim is an immediate implication of equation (9) in the case of λ→ 0.”
The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer? (2009, unknown): “Table 4 gives a sample of results for different combinations of the two hiring costs, c and H, constructed such that the solutions for θ and w are in all cases the same as in the model with H =0 . As before the notation is eθ for the elasticity of θ with respect to p ,c alculated from eθ = 1 η p − e”