The theory of international environmental agreements

By Scott Barrett. 2005

191 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/204234a4080278cda175b583a06f3281e056008a

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Citations in the corpus

Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements (2012, unknown): “In an influential contribution, however, Barrett ð1994, 2005Þ has argued that equilibria in coalition formation games should be at least weakly renegotiation proof as defined in Farrell and Maskin ð1989Þ.44 The MPEs derived in the previous sections are all robust to this refinement, since MPEs are…”
Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes (2013, background): “Scott Barrett School of International and Public Affairs & Earth Institute Columbia University 420 West 118th Street, Room 1427 USA - 10027 New York NY sb3116@columbia.edu 31 July 2011 Revised 24 July 2012 Second Revision 26 October 2012 The idea for this paper came to me as I was thinking of how to”
The behavioural economics of climate change (2008, background): “However, a common denominator in almost all of this literature is the assumption that each negotiating country (or unit) will solely take into account its own material payoff in the negotiations (Barrett, 2005), which mimics the conventional microeconomics assumption for individual behaviour.”
Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics (2010, background): “There is a relatively large theoretical literature on negotiations related to transnational pollution, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1998), Asheim et al. (2006), but almost all of this literature assumes that each negotiating country cares solely about its own material payoff (cf. Barrett 2005).”
A Polycentric Approach to Global Climate Governance (2017, background): “Other, more decentralist approaches to climate governance go beyond this idea of top-down centralization, but still keep a strict focus on nation-states in the international arena, emphasizing their individual and often diverging incentive structures (Barrett 2005; Carraro 2003).”