Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: International evidence

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Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “However, prior studies examining excess leverage and tunneling activities have focused on controlling shareholders and ignored the potential role of multiple shareholders (see Attig, Ghoul and Guedhami, 2009; Faccio et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Liu and Tian, 2012; Qian and Yeung, 2015).”
Financial credibility, ownership, and financing constraints in private firms (2011, unknown): “Recent cross-country literature in finance and international business places considerable emphasis on the adverse effects of private benefits of control (e.g., Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Faccio et al., 2009).”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “…such as US, is present for multinational firms and is due to repatriation taxes (Sanchez and Yurdagul, 2013). shareholders and pursue activities that inevitably discredit the value of family firms (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; and Faccio et al., 2010).”