A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats

By Dean Lacy, Emerson M. S. Niou. Journal of Politics, 2004

187 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1e769e43ccc5364507475a005380e8c8be0a6e88

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Dursun Peksen
2. W. H. Kaempfer
3. N. Miller
4. A. Lowenberg
5. David Lektzian
6. S. Allen

Citations in the corpus

• The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions (2007, background): “Lacy and Niou (2004) use a multistage game model to demonstrate that sanctions are most likely to be imposed precisely when they are not likely to succeed, while the sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so as threats, without having to be imposed at all.”
• When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature (2019, background): “A growing body of research also focuses on the use and effectiveness of sanctions threats (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Peterson 2013; Whang, McLean, and Kuberski 2013).”
• The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions (2014, background): “See Lacy and Niou 2004; Drezner 2003; and Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005.”