Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms

By R. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan. 2000

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking : Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings (2008, unknown): “11 A number of recent papers have been emphasizing the role of private interest groups on the design of deposit insurance systems around the world (see, Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2007) and Laeven (2004) for crosscountry evidence, and Kroszner and Strahan (2001) for voting behavior in the U.”
The theory of financial intermediation: An essay on what it does (not) explain (2003, background): “Political factors have been introduced too, in order to explain the relationship between financial and economic development (see Fohlin, 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2000).”
The Political Economy of Finance (2001, methodology): “These approaches have been applied to the analysis of financial regulation by Berglöf and Rosenthal (2000) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999, 2000).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “55 See also Krasa and Villamil (1992) and Hellwig (2000a) for generalizations of Diamond’s result. recently, however, preservation of the banker’s incentives to monitor also requires a careful specification of deposit contracts.”