Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account

By William John Bickle. 2003

305 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1e07006740a015acde11669024ba08eadde89373

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Citations in the corpus

Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions* (2010, background): “Even if cellular and molecular neuroscience are the central disciplines within or of neuroscience (Bickle 2003), cognitive neuroscience incorporates the lower-level findings: mechanisms are already among the criteria for individuating anatomical areas, and single areas can contain multiple…”
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches (2011, background): “…are not multiply realizable—or that if functional or psychological properties are multiply realizable, then they are not natural kinds (Bechtel 2009; Bechtel and Mundale 1999; Bickle 2003, 2006; P.M. Churchland 2007; Couch 2005; Kim 1992; Polger 2004, 2009; Shagrir 2008; Shapiro 2000, 2004).”
THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE PERSONAL/SUBPERSONAL DISTINCTION (2012, background): “Bickle (2003) for example, holds that subpersonal psychological explanations merely serve as methodological tools to help us locate the "real neurobiological explanations" (Bickle 2003, 110) that don't cite mental states: 6 See also Thau (2007) on the distinction between internal and instantial…”
Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. (2005, background): “Few investigators of sensory affects (such as the pleasure of taste sensation) are willing to explicitly cultivate the working hypothesis that animals do have affective experiences (e.g., Berridge & Robinson , 2003).”
Mechanisms and psychological explanation (2007, background): “…explanation, consider two further examples that have figured prominently in the recent philosophical literature: electro-chemical synaptic transmission (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 8-13; Bickle, 2003, pp. 62-50) and stereoptic color and depth perception in state-space (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992).”
Reductionism and complexity in molecular biology (2004, background): “The most extreme manifestation of the reductionist view is the belief that is held by some neuroscientists that consciousness and mental states can be reduced to chemical reactions that occur in the brain (Bickle, 2003; Van Regenmortel, 2004).”