Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights (2013, unknown): “Because an increase in patent value increases the likelihood of patent litigation (Galasso and Schankerman, 2010), trade increases litigation rates if it is only motivated by product market gains.”
Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (2013, background): “…Shapiro (2008) and Noel and Schankerman (2013) on the theory side and Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Ziedonis (2004), Hegde, Mowery, and Graham (2009), Galasso and Schankerman (2010), Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011), and Von Graevenitz, Wagner, and Harhoff (2013) on the empirical side.7 Our goal is to…”
When birds of a feather don’t flock together: Different scientists and the roles they play in biotech R&D alliances (2013, result): “Publication intensity has no association with patent performance and this result is consistent with the findings of Henderson and Cockburn (1994), Gambardella (1995), and Gittelman and Kogut (2003).”
Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts* (2015, unknown): “The difference between the two distributions is striking: the variance of the Federal Circuit fixed effects is much larger than the one we would observe if judges were voting following the same random process.”