Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems
By Nicolas Gisin, Sylvain Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, G. Ribordy. 2005
497 citations recorded by the source corpus.
General Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, i.e., attacks on Alice or Bob's system via the quantum channel, are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all systems must implement active counter measures. In particular, all systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any incoming light. We show that such counter measures can be efficient, provided that enough additional privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical way to reduce the maximal information gain that an adversary can gain using Trojan-horse attacks. This does reduce the security analysis of the two-way plug-and-play implementation to those of the standard one-way systems.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1d8e21b76490dad47f912d162df82d47c16f5eef
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Hoi-Kwong Lo
- Xiongfeng Ma
- Jian-Wei Pan
- Eleni Diamanti
- Feihu Xu
- Qiang Zhang
- Anthony Leverrier
- Momtchil Peev
In Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
- Hoi-Kwong Lo
- Xiongfeng Ma
- Jian-Wei Pan
- Eleni Diamanti
- Qiang Zhang
- Feihu Xu
- Anthony Leverrier
- Momtchil Peev
Citations in the corpus
- The security of practical quantum key distribution (2008, methodology): “Therefore it is necessary to implement active randomization (Gisin et al., 2006; Zhao, Qi and Lo, 2007).”
- Progress in satellite quantum key distribution (2017, background): “to check that no eavesdropper laser was also interrogating the retroreflector [66].”
- Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices (2020, background): “…al., 2001) Detection Detector Theory 2001 Faked-state (Makarov et al., 2006; Makarov and Hjelme, 2005) Detection Detector Theory 2005 Trojan horse (Gisin et al., 2006; Vakhitov et al., 2001) Source&Detection Backflection light Theory 2006 Time shift (Qi et al., 2007a; Zhao et al., 2008) Detection…”
- Practical challenges in quantum key distribution (2016, unknown): “Either countermeasures to Trojan horse attacks 119 or some trustworthiness to the BSM device is still required to establish the security of DDI-QKD.”
- Distributing Secret Keys with Quantum Continuous Variables: Principle, Security and Implementations (2015, methodology): “To this end, the so-called Trojan horse attacks were studied and implemented in the discrete-variable QKD case [73].”