Auditor Conservatism, Asymmetric Monitoring, and Earnings Management*

By J. Kim, Richard Chung, Michael Firth. 2003

476 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1d8ce0e9b188489eb327f6cd54d06f50a91e5e25

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Citations in the corpus

Do Better-Governed Australian Firms Make More Informative Disclosures? (2006, unknown): “However, the big-five auditors’ attention has been found to centre on constraining income-increasing earnings management activity (Kim et al., 2003), possibly because of asymmetric litigation risk.”
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality (2016, methodology): “As our purpose is to measure accounting conservatism, consistent with prior literature, AWCA are taken ‘signed’ (Cahan & Zhang, 2006; Kim et al., 2003).”
Corporate Governance and Disclosures on the Transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (2008, unknown): “that these firms have a greater incentive to protect their reputation because of their larger client base (Francis et al., 1999; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Kim et al. 2003; Krishnan, 2003).”
After Enron: Auditor Conservatism and Ex-Andersen Clients (2006, background): “Ratio of Nonaudit to Audit Fees Lys and Watts (1994) find evidence that where auditor independence is low (i.”
Audit Office Size, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing (2010, unknown): “30 This result is in line with the finding of Kim et al. (2003) that Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in constraining income-increasing earnings management, but they are not more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in deterring income-decreasing earnings management.”
Geographic Proximity between Auditor and Client: How Does it Impact Audit Quality? (2012, unknown): “This finding is not very surprising, because auditors tend to be more concerned about their clients’ incomeincreasing accruals (Kim et al. 2003).”
Innate and discretionary accruals quality and corporate governance (2010, unknown): “Prior international studies suggest that larger audit firms provide better quality audit services and a higher level of monitoring (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2003).”
Crash Risk and the Auditor-Client Relationship (2017, background): “Academic research suggests that potential litigation concerns incentivize auditors to closely monitor clients’ reporting choices that might mask bad news (e.g., Lys and Watts 1994; Heninger 2001; Baron et al. 2001; Kim et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2006; DeFond et al. 2012).”
Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment (2016, methodology): “We use the signed DA in Model (2) instead of the absolute value of DA because stakeholders are more sensitive to upward earnings management (Kim et al. 2003; Watts 2003).”
Internal governance structures and earnings management (2005, unknown): “While examples such as Enron in the USA and HIH in Australia might suggest otherwise, the large firms are considered to be more effective monitors of the financial reporting process compared to smaller firms (Francis et al., 1999; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Kim et al., 2003).”