Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?

By C. Rijckeghem, Beatrice Weder. 2001

658 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1cc5124a547d6178d917c6044253d39131d49295

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Citations in the corpus

Corruption and the shadow economy: like oil and vinegar, like water and fire? (2011, positive): “Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that this relationship is stronger when bureaucrats’ wages are relatively low.9 We hypothesize that: (H7) The lower economic freedom—i.e., the higher the level of government interference—the higher is the level of corruption, ceteris paribus.”
Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter (2001, neutral): “These factors have been analyzed elsewhere – see Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) on public wages, and Ades and di Tella (1994) and Laffont and N’Guessan (1999) on openness and competitiveness – but we introduce them in our empirical analysis as additional controls for possible determinants…”
Corruption as an obstacle to development in developing countries: a review of literature (2011, result): “Evidence from case studies conducted in Ghana (1983), Peru (1991), Uganda (1992), Zambia (1994), Kenya (1995) and Tanzania (1996) showed a strong improvement in revenue collection following pay reforms in tax administration ( Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2002”
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY (2018, neutral): “…newly released data sets on low-income countries provided further evidence for an economically significant relationship between civil-service pay and corruption, although it was suggested that a very high increase in pay would be required to eradicate corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).”
Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results (2008, background): “Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) use the ratio of government wages to manufacturing wages and find it to be a significant determinant of corruption levels.”
Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development (2014, background): “For example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2008) and Panizza (2001) find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil-service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross-country averages.”
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2013, positive): “Our results could also be compared with the studies on the effect of civil servants’ pay on corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), although we look at elected officials and focus on administrative IQ rather than honesty.”
Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda (2005, background): “These are exacerbated by low quality of the bureaucracy and public sector wages (van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001), limited ability to impose administrative controls, and nontransparent rules, laws, and processes.”
The economist’s approach to the problem of corruption (2006, background): “On the basis of data on wages in civil service relative to those in manufacturing covering 31 developing countries and low-income OECD countries over the period 1982-94, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find a significant negative relation between relative wage and the corruption indicator of a count”
Corruption in Public Service delivery: an experimental Analysis (2009, background): “Thus, while Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) found that higher public servant salaries (relative to manufacturing wages) are associated with less corruption, neither Treisman (2000) nor Rauch and Evans (2000) were able to replicate the result using different proxies for the explanatory variable.”